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   I. REGULATORY AND FACTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A. PARTIES 
 Sylvanergy is a limited liability company located in the 
State of New Union.  It plans to construct a new biomass-fired 
electricity plant in the Village of Forestdale.  The proposed 
facility would consist of a biomass boiler electricity generation 
unit and a wood pellet fuel production plant.  Sylvanergy 
requested that the state air pollution control agency, the New 
Union Air Resources Board (NUARB), exempt its biomass facility 
from preconstruction permitting requirements under the Clean 
Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program, 
but NUARB denied this request.  Sylvanergy subsequently filed 
for a PSD permit as a major emitting facility.  The final PSD 
permit requires Sylvanergy to implement a Sustainable Forest 
Plan by purchasing and managing a dedicated reforestation area. 
Save Our Climate (SOC) is a non-profit organization under 
the laws of New Union.  SOC is concerned about the 
environmental and climate impacts of the Sylvanergy biomass 
facility.  It became involved in the PSD permit proceeding for the 
proposed facility in its early stages.  SOC filed extensive public 
comments on the draft permit, arguing that the facility should be 
1
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subject to BACT review for greenhouse gas emissions and, 
specifically, that partial carbon capture and storage should be 
imposed as BACT.  The Court has already determined that SOC, 
along with the other parties, has standing to pursue judicial 
review of the petition. 
Shaney Granger (Granger or the Regional Administrator) is 
the Regional Administrator for Region XIII of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  EPA is the federal 
agency responsible for enforcing and administering select 
environmental laws and regulations.  Its mission is to protect 
human health and the environment.  EPA has delegated its 
authority for issuance of Clean Air Act PSD permits in the State 
of New Union to NUARB.  Although NUARB is the head agency 
involved in the PSD permitting process, in cases where the 
Environmental Appeals Board denies initial review of the permit, 
the EPA Regional Administrator must place her final approval on 
the PSD permit and publish the “final permit decision” in the 
Federal Register.  See 40 CFR § 124.19(l)(2)(i) (2015).  Thus, as 
the EPA Regional Administrator, Granger is the appropriate 
respondent for the purposes of judicial review because Granger, 
in her official capacity, issued the final permit decision at issue.  
Granger’s position will most often be referred to generally as 
“EPA’s” position. 
 
B. APPLICABLE LEGAL AUTHORITY* 
Enacted in 1955 and significantly amended in 1963, 1970, 
1977, and 1990, the Clean Air Act is the comprehensive federal 
law that regulates air emissions from stationary and mobile 
sources in the U.S.  Through the Act, EPA regulates emissions of 
“air pollutants,” which are broadly defined to mean “any air 
pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any 
physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter 
which is emitted into or other otherwise enters the ambient air.”  
 
* See generally Overview of the CAA, in CHRIS WOLD ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
THE LAW at 539-43 (2009).  Readers seeking additional review of the Clean Air 
Act’s regulatory framework should consult EPA’s Clean Air Act website, which 
includes among other resources a “Plain English” overview of the Act and links 
to the current statutory text. 
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CAA § 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2012).  Pursuant to section 
108(a)(1) of the Act, if EPA determines that a given air pollutant 
“may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare,” EPA must place the pollutant on a published list, thus 
making it a “regulated pollutant” subject to the various 
regulatory provisions of the Act.  42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2012).  
EPA is required to publish and maintain National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for six common air pollutants, 
known as “criteria pollutants:”  Particulate Matter (PM); Sulfur 
Dioxide (SO2); Nitrogen Oxides (NOX); Ground-Level Ozone, 
Carbon Monoxide (CO); and Lead. Importantly, the regulatory 
requirements differ for areas that are considered to be in 
compliance with the NAAQs—so-called “attainment” areas—and 
areas that are not in compliance—non-attainment areas.  
Attainment areas are further divided into three Classes, allowing 
for different levels of increases in certain air pollutants, with 
Class I areas such as national parks and wilderness areas 
receiving the highest degree of protection. Criteria pollutants are 
distinguished from hazardous air pollutants (HAPs), 187 of which 
EPA regulates through its Air Toxics program.  The Clean Air Act 
contemplates a “cooperative federalism” scheme, under which the 
federal government delegates power to carry out the 
requirements of the Act to the states.  States must submit State 
Implementation Plans (SIPs) to demonstrate how they will meet 
NAAQS and other CAA requirements within their borders. See 
CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410.  Once approved by EPA, the SIP 
becomes federal law.  Id. 
The Act differentiates between emissions limitations for 
stationary sources (Titles I, V) and mobile sources (Title II).  It 
also has different requirements for existing sources, which may 
be grandfathered in certain respects (e.g., CAA § 111(d)), and 
proposed new sources, which are subject to more stringent 
standards (e.g., CAA § 111(b)).  New stationary sources are 
regulated by two main schemes.  The first is the section 111 New 
Source Performance Standards (NSPS), which require certain 
categories and classes of new stationary sources to comply with 
emissions standards based on the best demonstrated technology.  
See CAA § 111(a)-(b), U.S.C. § 7411(a)-(b) (2012).  The second is 
the New Source Review (NSR) program, which develops 
technological requirements for emissions control through 
3
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permitting.  Within New Source Review, new stationary sources 
and major modifications of existing sources in attainment areas 
are subject to the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) 
permitting program, see CAA §§ 160-196, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 
(2012).1 
In the context of this year’s Problem, Sylvanergy has 
proposed to develop a new stationary source in an attainment 
area.  Thus, the focus is narrow and implicates the PSD program, 
found in sections 160 through 169 of the Act.  The Congressional 
purposes of the PSD program include: (1) to protect public health 
and welfare from any adverse effects of air pollution; (2) “to 
insure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent 
with the preservation of existing clean air resources;” (3) to 
prevent new non-attainment areas and assure that emissions 
from one state will not interfere with PSD efforts in another 
state; and (4) “to assure that any decision to permit increased air 
pollution . . . is made only after careful evaluation of all the 
consequences of such a decision and after adequate procedural 
opportunities for informed public participation in the 
decisionmaking process.”  CAA § 160, 42 U.S.C. § 7470. Under the 
PSD program, all “major emitting facilities” that will emit more 
than a threshold level of regulated pollutants must first obtain 
preconstruction approval in the form of a PSD permit. CAA 
§§ 165(a), 169(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a), 7479(1).  This includes 
“fossil-fuel fired steam electric plants” and other enumerated 
source categories with heat input capacities of more than 250 
MMBtu per hour, if they have the potential to emit more than 
100 tons per year of regulated air pollutants.  CAA § 169, 42 
U.S.C. § 7479(1).  All other facilities are considered “major” if 
they have the potential to emit more than 250 tons per year of a 
regulated air pollutant.  Id. 
 
1. New stationary sources and major modifications in non-attainment are-
as, by contrast, are subject to Non-Attainment New Source Review (NNSR).  See 
CAA §§ 171-193, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7515 (2012). The Clean Air Act also includes 
regulatory programs designed to address specific environmental problems such 
as acid rain (Title IV-A) and ozone depletion (Title VI).  Title V of the Act re-
quires major sources of air pollutants, and certain other sources, to obtain and 
operate in compliance with an operating permit.  None of those Titles are at is-
sue in the Problem, but competitors may look to parallel definitions or require-
ments in the Act for persuasive guidance. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/2
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New facilities subject to PSD review must achieve emissions 
limits that reflect the Best Available Control Technology, or 
BACT, for regulated pollutants that they emit at significant 
rates.  See CAA § 165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).  BACT is 
defined as 
an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of 
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this 
chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting 
facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts 
and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through 
application of production processes and available methods, 
systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or 
treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of 
each such pollutant. 
CAA § 169(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3); see also 40 C.F.R. 
§ 52.21(b)(12) (2015). 
Since the hallmark decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497 (2007), which established that greenhouse gases fall 
within the Act’s broad definition of “air pollutant” and spurred 
EPA’s 2009 “endangerment finding” with regard to greenhouse 
gas emissions from mobile sources, the manner in which EPA will 
regulate these emissions from stationary sources through the 
CAA framework has remained in flux.  With specific regard to the 
PSD program, the regulations provide that PSD review applies 
not only to criteria pollutants, but to “any pollutant that 
otherwise is subject to regulation under the Act.” 40 C.F.R. 
§ 52.21(50)(iv).  In 2010, EPA issued its GHG Tailoring Rule, 
setting special emissions thresholds for greenhouse gases to 
define when PSD and Title V Operating Permits would be 
required.  The threshold for PSD permitting, effective January 
2011, was 75,000 tons per year CO2e.  40 C.F.R. § 52.21(49)(iv).  
In 2014, the Supreme Court held in Utility Air Regulatory Group 
v. EPA (“UARG”), 573 U.S. __, __, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), that 
EPA could not subject sources to PSD review solely on the basis of 
their greenhouse gas emissions.  Under that ruling, however, 
sources that would be subject to PSD permitting and BACT for 
other air pollutants (so-called “anyway sources”) are subject to 
BACT review for greenhouse gas emissions.  The UARG decision 
5
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required EPA to publish a new de minimis threshold level for 
triggering PSD review for greenhouse gases from these anyway 
sources.  The Court did not reject 75,000 tons per year as a 
possible de minimis level but stated that EPA must identify a 
“true de minimis” level based on proper methodology.  EPA 
initiated a rule-making in April 2015 to identify a new significant 
emissions rate threshold for greenhouse gases and has projected a 
proposed rulemaking for June 2016. 
List of Applicable Rules of Law: 
 Clean Air Act § 160, 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (2012) 
 Clean Air Act § 165, 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2012) 
 Clean Air Act § 169, 42 U.S.C. § 7479 (2012) 
 Clean Air Act § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2012) 
 Definition, Major Stationary Source, 
40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(1)(i) (2015) 
 Definition, BACT, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(12) (2015) 
 Definition, Potential to Emit, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4) 
 Definition, Federally Enforceable, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 51.21(b)(17) 
 EPA Delegation Authority, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(u) (2015) 
 Appeal of PSD Permits, 40 C.F.R. § 124.19 (2015) 
Non-Binding Agency Guidelines: 
 NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP MANUAL: 
PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND 
NONATTAINMENT AREA PERMITTING (“NSR MANUAL”) 
(1990) 
 GUIDANCE FOR DETERMINING BEST AVAILABLE 
CONTROL TECHNOLOGY FOR REDUCING CARBON 
DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM BIOGENIC PRODUCTION 
(“GUIDANCE FOR DETERMINING BACT”) (2011) 
 DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING BIOGENIC CO2 
EMISSIONS FROM STATIONARY SOURCES (2014) 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/2
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C. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
The undisputed facts established by the Environmental 
Appeals Board are as follows:2 
Sylvanergy, L.L.C., has proposed to construct a new biomass 
facility in the Village of Forestdale, New Union.  New Union is 
considered to be an attainment area under the Clean Air Act, 
meaning that new major emissions sources are subject to the 
preconstruction permitting process under the Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD) program of the Clean Air Act.  
The New Union Air Resources Board (NUARB), as the state 
permitting agency, is authorized to issue PSD preconstruction 
permits pursuant to a delegation memorandum entered into 
between Region XIII of EPA and the State of New Union.  As 
proposed, the Forestdale Biomass Facility would house two 
components: a biomass-fired electricity generation unit with a 
heat input capacity of 500 MMBtu/hour3 and a wood pellet fuel 
production plant.  The electricity generation unit (EGU) would 
include an advanced stoker design wood-fired boiler with two 
ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) start-up burners, each with a 
maximum heat input rate of 60 MMBtu/hr. The EGU would have 
an electrical generation capacity of 40 MW. 
Sylvanergy has estimated that, based on an operational 
capacity of 96 percent, the facility would emit the following 
amounts of the following regulated air pollutants (in tons per 
year): PM 2.5: 63; SO2: 45; NOx: 110; CO: 255;4 Volatile Organic 
Compounds (VOC): 40.  However, operations at the biomass 
facility are subject to certain limitations in a site plan approval 
issued by the Village of Forestdale, which limits operations to no 
 
2. Although this factual summary contains all pertinent facts and proce-
dure as developed by the opinion of the Environmental Appeals Board, it is con-
densed.  Judges and brief graders should also review the Problem. 
3. MMBtu stands for one million British Thermal Units (Btu).  A Btu is a 
measure of the energy content in fuel.  Btu per hour is a measure used to de-
scribe the power or capacity of an electricity generation unit (EGU) and is used 
to measure both the energy input and the energy output of the EGU.  Here, the 
relevant statistic is the heat input capacity, or burn rate, of the biomass EGU in 
MMBtu per hour. 
4. The bolded numbers represent emissions levels above the PSD thresh-
olds—either 100 or 250 tons per year—for a “major emitting facility” under sec-
tion 169(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). 
7
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more than 6,500 hours per year—the equivalent of a capacity 
factor of 75 percent.  This limitation can be enforced by the 
building inspector of Forestdale.  It was adopted to mitigate the 
impact of log trucks bringing raw logs to the facility for 
processing into pellet fuel.  Based on this lower capacity factor, 
the facility would emit the following air pollutant amounts (in 
tons per year): PM 2.5: 47; SO2: 32; NOx: 80; CO: 190; VOC: 30.  
In addition, the facility would emit 350,000 tons per year of 
greenhouse gases in carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2E) while 
operating at full capacity. 
On January 15, 2013, Sylvanergy petitioned NUARB for a 
Non-Applicability Determination (NAD), urging NUARB to 
conclude that it did not meet the relevant emissions thresholds to 
qualify as a “major emitting facility” pursuant to section 169(1) of 
the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012).  Specifically, Sylvanergy 
argued that (1) it was not a “fossil-fuel fired steam electric plant” 
subject to the 100-ton-per-year threshold for emissions; and (2) 
due to the 75-percent capacity operational limit imposed on it by 
the Forestdale site plan approval, it would not have the potential 
to emit more than the otherwise-applicable threshold of 250 tons 
per year of regulated pollutants.  NUARB rejected both of these 
arguments and denied the NAD, reasoning that (1) since the 
facility would include ULSD start-up burners, it was a fossil-fuel 
fired facility subject to the 100-ton-per-year threshold pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) despite its primary reliance on wood biomass 
for energy production; and (2) even if the facility was not fossil-
fuel fired, the restriction on operating hours contained in the 
Forestdale site plan approval did not constitute a “federally 
enforceable” limitation, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4) 
(2015).  Sylvanergy then filed a PSD preconstruction permit 
application under protest. 
NUARB published a draft permit for public comment on 
September 12, 2013.  Over Sylvanergy’s objection, NUARB 
conducted a BACT review for greenhouse gas emissions as part of 
the PSD permit for the proposed facility, using a 96 percent 
capacity factor.  While Sylvanergy argued that it should be 
considered to have zero greenhouse gas emissions as a biomass 
facility, SOC filed detailed comments on the proposed permit and 
argued that not only was the Sylvanergy facility subject to BACT 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/2
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review for greenhouse gas emissions, but that NUARB should 
determine that BACT for greenhouse gases from the facility was 
partial carbon capture and storage using a system of wood fuel 
gasification and combined cycle combustion.  NUARB issued the 
final PSD permit on June 12, 2014.  In the final permit, NUARB 
approved Sylvanergy’s proposed flue controls for particulates, 
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and VOCs as 
constituting the BACT as required by section 165(a)(4) of the Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).  Thus, Sylvanergy has not challenged 
permit requirements for these regulated pollutants.  To 
summarize NUARB’s BACT review for greenhouse gases as 
reflected in the final permit, which the parties do challenge, the 
agency applied a top-down approach to available control 
technologies for greenhouse gases as follows: (a) NUARB 
considered carbon capture and storage as the technology capable 
of achieving the greatest reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
but rejected it on the grounds that there was no proven 
technology for removing CO2 from the dilute flue gas streams 
that result from biomass combustion; (b) NUARB considered 
whether use of alternative fuels such as natural gas or oil would 
result in lower carbon emissions for a 40-MW generation facility, 
and it concluded that such alternative fuels would constitute a 
redefinition of the facility and could not be considered as BACT; 
(c) NUARB considered and rejected the implementation of wood 
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage as an 
impermissible redefinition of the proposed source; and, finally, (d) 
NUARB considered and ultimately selected as BACT for the 
biomass facility the implementation of a Sustainable Forest Plan, 
which would require Sylvanergy to purchase and maintain a 
dedicated reforestation area. 
NUARB concluded that based on an assumed production rate 
of 10 dry tons of wood per hectare per year, the acquisition of 
25,000 hectares of dedicated forest land at a total cost of 
approximately $10 million was economically feasible.  The 
Sustainable Forest Plan would offset approximately 70 percent of 
the greenhouse gas emissions of the plant and assure sustainable 
biomass feedstock production based on short-rotation coppice 
plantings such as poplar.  NUARB noted that the requirement to 
acquire and maintain this forestation area was consistent with, 
and required by, New Union Executive Order 005-12, which 
9
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provides that all State agencies in New Union must, to the 
maximum extent allowed by law, ensure that any new 
construction project they undertake or approve will be carbon 
neutral.  The Executive Order does not distinguish between 
actions taken pursuant to State law and actions taken pursuant 
to delegated federal authority.  During the permit proceedings, 
Sylvanergy did not challenge NUARB’s finding that suitable 
forestry land is available in the vicinity of Forestdale at a total 
cost of $10 million, nor did it contend that this cost would render 
the project economically unviable. 
The record contains the following additional information with 
regard to NUARB’s BACT analysis. SOC submitted on the record 
multiple studies in support of the feasibility of wood gasification 
and combined cycle gasification technology, which uses steam 
reformation of the resulting synthetic gas in order to separate out 
the carbon dioxide gases for sequestration.  First, SOC submitted 
geological studies showing that Forestdale is located on the Union 
Shale geologic unit, which consists of a 4,000-foot-deep layer of 
shale deposits overlying a sandstone layer known as the 
Comptom Formation.  This formation is said to be an ideal 
location for a carbon capture and storage facility and is very 
similar to the Decatur Carbon Sequestration Demonstration 
facility in Illinois, which is sponsored by the United States 
Department of Energy.  Second, SOC submitted the 2005 Rhodes 
and Keith Study, which concluded that a biomass gasification, 
steam reformation, carbon sequestration, and energy production 
plant was technically and economically feasible using 
technologies already in use with an overall electric generation 
efficiency of approximately 25 percent [note: this efficiency is 
approximately the same as that for Sylvanergy’s proposed 
advanced stoker wood fired boiler] and could achieve a carbon 
sequestration efficiency of 55 percent.  The Rhodes and Keith 
Study concluded that such a plant could generate electricity at a 
cost of approximately 9 cents per kilowatt hour, with costs 
converted to year-2000 dollars and assuming no market for 
carbon offsets.  The study also concluded that the cost per 
kilowatt hour would decrease with an available market for selling 
carbon offsets generated by sequestration. Finally, SOC 
submitted an analysis by an environmental economist, Dr. 
Costanza Outt, updating the costs assumed in the Rhodes and 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol7/iss1/2
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Keith Study.  Dr. Outt concluded that, taking into account 
inflation and cost increases since 2000, the reduced 
transportation costs of on-site carbon storage facilities due to the 
site geology, and the existing market for carbon credits available 
to Sylvanergy on the Outer States Greenhouse Exchange (a 
regional greenhouse gas emissions trading system), Sylvanergy’s 
cost per kilowatt hour for generating electricity using wood 
gasification and carbon sequestration would remain about 9 cents 
per kilowatt hour.  NUARB did not reject any of the factual 
assertions made by SOC.  Regarding the Sustainable Forest Plan, 
SOC submitted extensive comments and ecological studies 
asserting that monoculture forestry practices as contemplated by 
the Sustainable Forest Plan destroy biodiversity and promote 
tree diseases and pest invasions.  Conversely, the New Union 
Loggers Association submitted comments regarding the 
employment that will be provided by a dedicated New Union-
based source of wood fuel feedstocks for the facility. 
On July 10, 2014, both Sylvanergy and SOC filed timely 
petitions for review of the final PSD permit with the 
Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) pursuant to 40 C.F.R. 
§ 124.19(a) (2015), requesting that the permit be remanded to 
NUARB for further consideration.  Sylvanergy challenged both 
NUARB’s initial denial of its Non-Applicability Determination 
request and the final PSD permit.  As to the final permit, 
Sylvanergy argued that as a biomass facility, it should not be 
subject to BACT review for its biogenic greenhouse gases, and, 
even if it is subject to BACT for those gases, biofuel combustion 
should have been considered BACT per se, and the Sustainable 
Forest Plan constituted an impermissible “beyond-the-fence” 
measure outside of the control of Sylvanergy’s control.  SOC 
argued that NUARB erred by rejecting wood gasification and 
carbon sequestration as BACT and that the Sustainable Forest 
Plan should have been rejected under BACT step 4 as having 
unacceptable adverse environmental impacts. 
On June 1, 2015, the EAB denied both petitions for review, 
concluding as an initial matter that it lacked jurisdiction to 
review NUARB’s denial of Sylvanergy’s NAD request pursuant to 
40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a), which confers jurisdiction to the EAB to 
review only a “PSD final permit decision.”  Regarding the 
11
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contents of the final permit, the EAB concluded that none of the 
issues raised constituted a “clearly erroneous finding of fact or 
conclusion of law” or “an important matter of policy or exercise of 
discretion” that warranted exercise of its jurisdiction pursuant to 
40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a). Specifically, the EAB concluded that (1) 
current legal authority did not provide grounds to exempt 
Sylvanergy’s biogenic greenhouse gas emissions from PSD review; 
(2) the Sustainable Forest Plan was within the control of 
Sylvanergy and its adoption did not constitute clear error by 
NUARB; and (3) NUARB did not commit clear error when it 
determined that requiring wood gasification and carbon 
sequestration would impermissibly “redefine” the Sylvanergy 
facility.  The EAB order provided that the Regional Administrator 
of EPA Region XIII should publish the decision as a final agency 
action in the Federal Register according to 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(2)-
(3).  Sylvanergy and SOC filed timely petitions to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit pursuant to 
section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012), 
seeking judicial review of the final decision of Regional 
Administrator Shaney Granger. 
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II. ISSUES 
The parties have been ordered to brief the following issues on 
appeal: 
 Whether the Court has jurisdiction to review NUARB’s 
denial of Sylvanergy’s request for a Non-Applicability 
Determination (NAD). 
o On appeal, Sylvanergy will argue that the Court 
has jurisdiction to review the NAD issue. 
o On appeal, SOC and Granger will argue that the 
Court lacks jurisdiction to review the NAD issue. 
 If the Court has jurisdiction to review the denial of the 
NAD, whether NUARB properly determined that the 
Sylvanergy facility is a major emitting facility subject 
to PSD review because it is a fossil-fuel fired source 
subject to the 100 ton-per-year threshold under section 
169(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012). 
o On appeal, Sylvanergy and Granger will argue 
that the biomass facility is not a fossil-fuel fired 
source merely because it will use diesel-fueled 
startup burners. 
o On appeal, SOC will argue that the facility is a 
fossil-fuel fired source because it will burn diesel 
fuel to run the startup burners, and the 100 ton-
per-year threshold applies because the facility will 
have a total heat input of over 250 MMBtu/year. 
 If the Sylvanergy facility is not a fossil-fuel fired source, 
whether it nonetheless is a major emitting facility 
triggering PSD review because it has the potential to 
emit more than 250 tons per year of carbon monoxide. 
o On appeal, Sylvanergy will argue that PSD 
review is not triggered because the Forestdale site 
plan approval limits it to 75-percent operational 
capacity, thus limiting its potential to emit carbon 
monoxide to 190 tons per year. 
o On appeal, SOC and Granger will argue that the 
proposed facility has the potential to emit more 
than 250 tons per year of carbon monoxide, thus 
13
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triggering PSD review, because the site plan 
limitations are not federally enforceable. 
 Whether a biomass facility is subject to PSD review as an 
emitter of greenhouse  gases. 
o On appeal, Sylvanergy will argue that biomass-
fueled facilities are de facto exempt from PSD 
review for greenhouse gases. 
o On appeal, SOC and Granger will argue that 
biomass facilities are subject to PSD review for 
greenhouse gases and that Sylvanergy meets the 
threshold emissions level to trigger such review. 
 Whether NUARB properly rejected consideration of a wood 
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage 
plant as BACT for GHG emissions from the facility. 
o On appeal, SOC will argue that that NUARB 
improperly rejected this option in its BACT 
analysis. 
o On appeal, Sylvanergy and Granger will argue 
that NUARB properly rejected it. 
 Whether NUARB permissibly imposed the Sustainable 
Forest Plan as BACT for the GHG emissions from the 
facility. 
o On appeal, Granger will argue that it was 
permissible for NUARB to impose the Plan as 
BACT. 
o On appeal, Sylvanergy and SOC argue it was 
impermissible to impose the Plan as BACT. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the United States courts of 
appeals to review these petitions by section 307(b) of the Clean 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2012).  Section 307(b)(1) allows for 
review not only of specifically enumerated actions by the EPA 
Administrator (such as rulemakings for NAAQS or setting of 
emission standards), but also of “any other final action of the 
Administrator under this chapter . . . which is locally or 
regionally applicable,” if filed in the appropriate circuit.  Id.; see 
also Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 587-92 (1980) 
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(interpreting section 307(b)(1) to reach “any action of the 
Administrator under the Act that is ‘final’ and not taken under a 
specifically enumerated provision” in section 307(b)(1)).  Here, the 
PSD permit issued by NUARB is attributed to EPA because 
NUARB has authority to issue federal permits on EPA’s behalf.  
See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(u) (2015); see also In re Milford Power 
Plant, 8 E.A.D. 670, 673 (EAB 1999).  The Court’s review should 
in general focus on NUARB’s decision, rather than the EAB’s 
order denying review and its underlying reasoning. Cf. Chabot-
Las Positas Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. EPA, 482 F. App’x 219, 221 (9th 
Cir. 2012); Sierra Club v. EPA, 762 F.3d 971, 979, 978-84 (9th 
Cir. 2014).  However, EAB’s analysis may nonetheless be 
relevant, and at least one court has framed its decision on an 
EPA BACT determination as upholding the Board’s ruling.  See 
Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 2007).  
“Generally, parties petitioning for review of agency decisions may 
only rely on evidence in the administrative record.”  U.S. 
Magnesium v. EPA, 690 F.3d 1157, 1164 (10th Cir. 2012). 
Although the statute includes a specified standard of review 
for certain subsections, such as for informal rulemakings by EPA, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2012), the statute is silent on the 
standard of review for other types of agency actions.  In such 
cases it is appropriate for the Court to proceed pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s general standard of review for 
agency actions.  See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 
540 U.S. 461, 496–97 & n. 18 (2004); NRDC v. EPA, 638 F.3d 
1183, 1190 (9th Cir. 2011).  Accordingly, the Court may set aside 
the challenged PSD permit decision if it is “arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).  The Court’s review of the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute that Congress has entrusted it to 
administer must be guided by Chevron deference.  See Chevron v. 
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding that where the Clean 
Air Act is either “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute”).  “A reviewing 
court must generally be at its most deferential” when the agency 
is “making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the 
frontiers of science.”  Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 
U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
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IV. JURISDICTION: DOES THE COURT HAVE 
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW NUARB’S DENIAL 
OF THE NON-APPLICABILITY 
DETERMINATION? 
The Court has jurisdiction to review the final PSD permit 
decision pursuant to section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), which provides for reviews of “any other final 
action of the Administrator under this chapter . . . which is locally 
or regionally applicable,” if filed in the appropriate circuit.  
Appeals pursuant to this provision are subject to a sixty-day 
statute of limitations, which begins to run when notice of the final 
action appears in the Federal Register.  Id.  Here, there has been 
a final agency action on the PSD permit because Sylvanergy and 
SOC have exhausted their administrative remedies, “the 
Environmental Appeals Board issue[d] notice to the parties that 
the petition for review has been denied,” and the EPA Regional 
Administrator published notice of the final agency action in the 
Federal Register.  40 CFR § 124.19(l)(2)(i), (3) (2015).  The issue 
of whether the Court also has jurisdiction to concurrently review 
NUARB’s denial of the Non-Applicability Determination (NAD) 
request will turn on whether the NAD is itself a final decision of 
the Administrator and whether Sylvanergy missed its 
opportunity to seek judicial review of the NAD. 
The Court’s determination of whether the denial of the NAD 
is a reviewable final agency action must be distinct from the 
EAB’s analysis declining to review the issue, see Problem at 8, 
because while the regulations confer jurisdiction on the EAB to 
review only a “final PSD permit decision,” 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a), 
the Courts of Appeal may review “any other final action of the 
Administrator” under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).  
The Supreme Court has interpreted “final action of the 
Administrator” under section 307(b)(1) to track the APA’s final 
agency action requirement.  See Alaska Dept. of Envtl. 
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 483 (2004) (holding that EPA 
compliance orders were a final agency action where “EPA had 
asserted its final position on the factual circumstances 
underpinning the Agency’s orders” and “practical and legal 
consequences” resulted); see also Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 
446 U.S. 578, 586-92 (1980) (holding that the EPA 
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Administrator’s decision regarding applicability of section 111 
NSPS to a facility’s waste-heat boilers was a locally applicable, 
final agency action subject to review pursuant to the section 
307(b)(1) “any other final action” provision). To be final, an 
agency action must “mark the consummation of the agency’s 
decisionmaking process,” and rights or obligations or other legal 
consequences must flow from the decision.  Bennett v. Spear, 
520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).  Nonfinal decisions, including 
decisions where the petitioner has not exhausted his or her 
administrative remedies, are considered “interlocutory” and do 
not warrant review in federal court unless a relevant exception to 
the final judgment rule applies.  See Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. 
EPA, 889 F.2d 292, 295 (1st Cir. 1989). 
Sylvanergy will argue that although legal consequences do 
flow from a NAD decision, the NAD process can also be seen as a 
step in the PSD review process.  With respect to the final PSD 
permit decision, Sylvanergy’s petition is timely. The NAD process 
is not explicated in the statute nor in the regulations; rather, it is 
an informal system to help the agency determine if it will proceed 
with full PSD review.  There is support for this position in FTC v. 
Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980), in which the Supreme 
Court held that an FTC decision to initiate administrative 
proceedings against a company was not final for the purposes of 
review, despite the “substantial” burden imposed on the company 
to participate in the proceedings.  Under the APA, agency actions 
that are merely “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate” are 
subject to judicial review at the termination of the proceeding in 
which the interlocutory ruling is made.  See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).  
Sylvanergy may argue that a similar approach should be 
applied to review under section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 
and that review of the NAD denial is most appropriate at this 
final stage, where the more concrete legal consequences of permit 
conditions have been imposed.  This position also lends itself to a 
judicial economy argument that the EPA PSD review process 
should be reviewed in a single proceeding rather than in a 
piecemeal fashion.  SOC and EPA can respond with a policy 
argument that administrative resources are more effectively used 
if section 307(b)(1) is read to allow for review of NAD decisions 
early on: If the Court were to reverse NUARB’s denial of the NAD 
because PSD review was not necessary, both the agency and the 
17
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applicant could avoid the costly and time-consuming process of 
PSD review. 
SOC and EPA have a persuasive argument based on Puerto 
Rican Cement, 889 F.2d 292, that NUARB’s denial of the NAD is 
a final agency action, but it is an action separate from the final 
permit decision and its review is now barred due to the sixty-day 
jurisdictional time limitation.  In Puerto Rican Cement, EPA 
denied a request for a NAD, and the petitioner appealed the NAD 
issue directly to the court before EPA continued with the 
permitting process.  The First Circuit held that the NAD decision 
was separately reviewable pursuant to section 307(b)(1) as a 
“final action of the administrator,” in part because the agency’s 
position on PSD applicability was “final and authoritative, [and] 
court review [would] not ‘deprive the agency of the opportunity to 
refine, revise or clarify the . . . matter at issue.’” Id. at 294-96 
(citing Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park Comm’n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 
1034, 1040 (1st Cir. 1982)).  As the First Circuit described it, 
“EPA . . . has created an administratively separate agency 
decision making process for granting or denying NADs,” which 
supported a conclusion that EPA had waived exhaustion 
requirements for the purposes of judicial review of the NAD.  
Puerto Rican Cement, 889 F.2d at 296.  Thus, SOC and EPA can 
argue that the NAD process is distinct from the final PSD permit, 
and that Sylvanergy should have sought review within sixty days 
of NUARB denying the NAD.5  Because statutory time limitations 
are jurisdictional in nature, this Court is powerless to review the 
NAD issue at this time.  See Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 799 
F.2d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1986).  This argument is further bolstered 
by Hawaiian Electric Company v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1440, 1442–44 
(9th Cir. 1984), in which the Ninth Circuit held that EPA’s 
applicability determination that a proposed change constituted a 
“major modification” subjecting it to PSD review was a final 
action reviewable pursuant to section 307(b)(1). “[A]lthough 
application of the major modification definition is an interim step 
in the PSD permitting process,” the court held, “it has immediate 
 
5. Although the record does not indicate the specific date on which NUARB 
denied Sylvanergy’s NAD request, this decision would have had to occur before 
September 12, 2013, when NUARB issued the initial draft PSD permit. 
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legal consequences, i.e., the requirement of PSD review.” Id. at 
1442. 
In response, Sylvanergy can distinguish Puerto Rican 
Cement, in which the court itself recognized that a NAD may not 
be a final agency action because the company has not at that 
point exhausted its administrative remedies, and “in principle it 
could, by following the PSD review procedures,” obtain some form 
of building permission from EPA.  Puerto Rican Cement, 
889 F.2d at 295.  Grappling with the issue of a possible 
interlocutory appeal, the court seemed to rely in great part on the 
fact that EPA had not raised any objection to review of the NAD 
at that early stage, and it thus found that EPA had waived any 
applicable exhaustion requirements.  See id. at 296.  This is not 
the case here, as there was never a situation in which Sylvanergy 
appealed the NAD decision and EPA allowed for early review.  
Also of potential importance is that in that case, EPA itself 
denied the NAD rather than the state agency.  Unlike a final PSD 
permit decision, after which the regulations set forth a specific 
procedure for the EPA Administrator to give her approval, see 40 
C.F.R. § 124.19(l)(2)(i), the PSD decision lies with NUARB alone 
and is not published in the Federal Register.  Therefore, it may 
not be fully attributable to EPA as a “final action of the 
Administrator,” unless it is viewed as a component of the final 
PSD decision.  SOC and EPA can respond that under the CAA 
delegation framework, NUARB’s decisions are federal in nature 
and reviewable pursuant to section 307(b)(1). 
V. APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION: IF THIS 
COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE 
DENIAL OF THE NAD, DID NUARB PROPERLY 
DETERMINE THAT SYLVANERGY FACILITY IS A 
“MAJOR EMITTING FACILITY” SUBJECT TO PSD 
REVIEW? 
NUARB’s denial of Sylvanergy’s request for a non-
applicability determination is also, unsurprisingly, referred to as 
an “applicability determination.”  See NSR Manual at A. 1.  In 
other words, the agency has determined that PSD review must 
apply to the facility.  See id.  This issue turns on whether the 
proposed facility meets the definition of a “major emitting facility” 
19
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that will emit regulated pollutants in excess of threshold values.  
See CAA § 169(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). 
A.  Is the facility a “fossil-fuel fired steam electric plant” 
subject to the 100 ton-per-year threshold? 
Under section 169(1) of the Act, “major emitting facility” 
includes and PSD review is triggered for a “fossil-fuel fired steam 
electric plant” with a heat input exceeding 250 MMBtu when the 
plant will emit 100 tons per year (tpy) or more of a regulated 
pollutant.  42 U.S.C. § 7479(1).  Here, the Sylvanergy facility has 
a total heat input capacity of 500 MMBtu per hour.  But 
Sylvanergy contends that PSD should never have applied to its 
proposed facility because it is not a “fossil-fuel fired steam electric 
plant.”  EPA agrees with this position, despite NUARB having 
reached the opposite conclusion, likely because of EPA’s policy 
orientation to support the growth of biomass facilities.  SOC, 
however, contends that the facility is fossil-fuel fired because it 
proposes to use diesel fuel to power the two startup burners for 
the wood-fired boiler.  Thus, SOC argues, Sylvanergy’s emissions 
of both NOx (110 tpy) and carbon monoxide (255 tpy) are in 
excess of the 100-tpy threshold to trigger PSD review. 
Sylvanergy and EPA will argue that the facility should not 
be treated as fossil-fuel fired because it will use ultra-low sulfur 
diesel fuel only to start the electricity generation process, after 
which point the boiler is powered solely by biomass.  Although 
there is little in the PSD regulations or case law to guide the 
Court’s interpretation of the term “fossil-fuel fired steam electric 
plant,”6 Sylvanergy and EPA can point to definitions found 
elsewhere in the statute: 
 The NSPS regulations define “fossil-fuel-fired steam 
generating unit” as “a furnace or boiler used in the 
process of burning fossil fuel for the purpose of 
 
6. There is also little in the legislative history of the PSD provisions to help 
draw the line as to when an EGU becomes a “fossil-fuel fired steam electric 
plant.”  For a broad overview of the legislative history surrounding the 1977 
Clean Air Amendments and their effect on the PSD program, see W. Perry Pend-
ley and J. Michael Morgan, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: A Select 
Legislative Analysis, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 747, 749-83 (1978). 
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producing steam by heat transfer.”  40 C.F.R. § 60.41 
(2015). 
 The SIP regulations also define “fossil-fuel-fired 
generator” as “a furnace or boiler used in the process 
of burning fossil fuel for the primary purpose of 
producing steam by heat transfer.”  40 C.F.R. 
§ 51.100(ee) (2015) (emphasis added). 
 “Fossil fuel” is further defined in the NSPS 
regulations to include “natural gas, petroleum, coal, 
and any form of solid, liquid, or gaseous fuel derived 
from such materials for the purpose of creating useful 
heat.”  Id. 
Although steam from the wood boiler will presumably be used to 
drive a turbine generator to produce electricity, Sylvanergy is 
using diesel fuel for start-up only, not for “producing steam by 
heat transfer.”  Rather, the biomass is the material used in the 
boiler to produce steam.  Section 169(1) also includes “fossil-fuel 
boilers” as an enumerated source category.7  EPA could have 
enumerated “wood-fired boilers” in the list of regulated source 
categories, but it did not, and under the expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius canon of statutory interpretation, the Court 
should read the list of enumerated sources as excluding biomass 
plants. 
SOC can respond that although the diesel fuel is used for 
start-up purposes only, the primary goal of the system is 
nonetheless to produce steam by heat transfer and ultimately 
produce electricity.  This position is supported by the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in PPG Industries v. Harrison, 660 F.2d 628, 
633-34 (5th Cir. 1981), which interpreted the NSPS definition 
broadly to include not only boilers operating entirely on fossil fuel 
but also waste heat boilers which used a combination of fossil fuel 
and waste heat gases.  The court stated that waste heat boilers 
were included because, in a general sense, they are “used in the 
 
7. The parties may refer to a recent report by the Partnership for Policy In-
tegrity titled Trees, Trash, and Toxics: How Biomass Energy Has Become the 
New Coal (April 2014), which claims to have surveyed 88 biomass facilities, all 
but five of which have been allowed to emit over the 100-tons-per-year threshold 
without triggering PSD review.  This study, for obvious reasons, is not favorable 
to Sylvanergy in its general case.  It also lacks clear data for its case studies and 
has been considered a controversial study overall. 
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process of burning fossil fuel . . . for the purpose of producing 
steam.”  Id. at 633.  SOC’s position is also supported by EPA’s 
own interpretation of the statute in its NSR Manual.  In its 
explanation of PSD applicability, EPA distinguished between a 
hypothetical 300 MMBtu/hr boiler that is permitted to burn any 
fossil fuel, which would be subject to the 100-tpy threshold, and a 
boiler that is permitted to burn wood only, which would not be.  
See NSR Manual at A.22-23 (1990). 
Finally, Sylvanergy and EPA can point to the fact that the 
PSD program also breaks PSD review down in terms of 
“emissions units,” which means “any part of a stationary source 
that emits or would have the potential to emit any regulated NSR 
pollutant.”  40 C.F.R. § 51.21(b)(7) (2015).  There is an argument 
here that the start-up burners should be treated separately from 
the electricity generating unit.  Although the biomass facility’s 
total heat input for biomass is 500 MMBtu, the heat input 
capacity of the two startup burners (at 60 MMBtu each) is only 
120 MMBtu.  Thus, the start-up burners as an emissions unit do 
not meet the 250 MMBtu heat input capacity level.  SOC can 
respond that the section 169(1) definition does not specify that 
the 250 MMBtu heat input need be attributable to fossil fuels 
only, and that the facility’s combined heat inputs of 500 MMBtu 
per hour and 120 MMBtu per hour puts it well above the 
threshold level.  If the facility will be emitting regulated 
pollutants from its stacks and is burning fossil fuels, regulation of 
this facility as a fossil-fuel fired source is supported by the PSD 
program’s broad purpose “to protect public health and welfare 
from any actual or potential adverse effect which in the 
Administrator’s judgment may reasonably be anticipate to occur 
from air pollution.”  CAA § 160(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7470(1). 
B.  Does the facility otherwise have the “potential to emit” 
more than 250 tons per year of carbon monoxide despite 
the Village of Forestdale site plan approval? 
If the facility cannot be considered a fossil-fuel fired source, 
Sylvanergy contends it also does not fall under the general 
category of “any other source with the potential to emit” 250 tons 
per year or more of regulated air pollutants because, pursuant to 
the operational limitations imposed on it by the Village of 
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Forestdale’s site plan approval, it will emit at most 190 tons per 
year of carbon monoxide.  EPA and SOC contend that these 
limitations are irrelevant because they are not federally 
enforceable, and as such, PSD is triggered because the facility 
should be considered to emit 255 tons per year of carbon 
monoxide.  Importantly, EPA has promulgated regulations 
defining “potential to emit” to include consideration of only those 
pollution controls that are “federally enforceable.”  “Potential to 
emit,” or PTE, is defined by 40 C.F.R. § 51.21(b)(4) (2015) as: 
The maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant 
under its physical and operational design. Any physical or 
operational limitation on the capacity of the source to emit a 
pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and 
restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of 
material combusted, stored, or processed, shall be treated as part 
of its design if the limitation or the effect it would have on 
emissions is federally enforceable. Secondary emissions do not 
count in determining the potential to emit of a stationary source. 
(Emphasis added). 
“Federally enforceable” is further defined by 40 C.F.R. 
§ 51.21(b)(17) (2015) to mean: 
all limitations and conditions which are enforceable by the 
Administrator, including those requirements developed pursuant 
to 40 CFR parts 60 and 61, requirements within any applicable 
State implementation plan, any permit requirements established 
pursuant to 40 CFR 52.21 or under regulations approved 
pursuant to 40 CFR part 51, subpart I, including operating 
permits issued under an EPA-approved program that is 
incorporated into the State implementation plan and expressly 
requires adherence to any permit issued under such program.  
(Emphasis added). 
SOC and EPA have a persuasive argument that the Village 
of Forestdale’s site approval process is not federally enforceable 
within the meaning of these regulations so as to affect the 
analysis of the facility’s potential to emit.  The record does not 
indicate that the site plan approval is incorporated in any way 
into New Union’s State Implementation Plan (SIP).  The record 
indicates only that the process was initiated by the Village of 
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Forestdale, apparently due to zoning concerns about the impact of 
logging trucks coming in and out of the area to deliver biomass 
fuel. The 75-percent operational limitation is enforceable by the 
Forestdale building inspector, but this official does not answer to 
NUARB.  See Problem at 5.  EPA has also explained in its NSR 
Manual that “federally enforceable” limitations must be either 
“contained in a permit issued pursuant to an EPA-approved 
permitting program or a permit directly issued by EPA, or . . . 
submitted to EPA as a revision to a State Implementation Plan 
and approved as such by EPA.”  NSR Manual at C.3; see also CAA 
§ 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012) (SIP requirement provisions).  EPA 
need not take Sylvanergy at its word that it will operate at only 
75-percent capacity, as that limitation is not included in the final 
permit as part of NUARB’s EPA-approved permitting program, 
has not been approved as part of New Union’s SIP, and is not 
otherwise federally enforceable.  Sylvanergy could have ensured 
that these limitations were placed in its final PSD permit with 
NUARB—a common practice that allows facilities to become 
“synthetic minors” subject to an abbreviated permitting process—
but Sylvanergy did not, thus raising the question of whether they 
really intend to comply with the limits. 
Sylvanergy should point to National Mining Ass’n v. EPA, 
59 F.3d 1351, 1364-65 (D.C. Cir. 1995), which held that a parallel 
definition of PTE under the National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS) permitting provisions, 40 
C.F.R. § 63.2 (2015), was an unreasonable standard because it 
failed to include mechanisms that are practically effective, even if 
not “federally enforceable,” in the determination of a facility’s 
PTE.  The D.C. Circuit did not vacate the regulation in that case, 
but it did indicate that state or local controls, when 
“demonstrably effective,” should not be disregarded in considering 
whether a facility is a “major” source in the context of NESHAPS.  
Id. at 1364.  SOC and EPA can point to differences between the 
NESHAPS statutory language and the PSD language to 
distinguish the National Mining Association case.  Unlike the 
PSD definition of “major emitting facility,” 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1), 
the NESHAPS provision defines “major source” for the purposes 
of triggering review as “any stationary source or group of 
stationary sources located within a contiguous area and under 
common control that emits or has the potential to emit 
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considering controls, in the aggregate, 10 tons per year or more of 
any hazardous air pollutant or 25 tons per year or more of any 
combination of hazardous air pollutants.”  CAA § 112(a)(1); 42 
U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).  The court in 
National Mining Association referred to EPA’s directive to 
“consider[] controls” to support its argument that controls 
imposed by a state or locality should be considered in the PTE 
analysis. 59 F.3d at 1364.  Because the PSD provisions do not 
contain a broad directive for EPA to “consider[] controls,” the PSD 
applicability analysis should be limited to considering those 
operations limitations that are enforceable by EPA.8 
In Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA, No. 89-1514, 1995 
WL 650098 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 1995), the D.C. Circuit remanded 
the PTE definition in the PSD regulations to EPA in an 
unpublished decision.  The court also vacated the federal 
enforceability requirement of the PTE definition.  In so doing, the 
court referenced its previous decision regarding the NESHAPS 
PTE regulations in National Mining Association.  In response, 
EPA issued an “interim policy,” explaining that the term 
“federally enforceable” should now be read to mean “federally 
enforceable or legally and practicably enforceable by a state or 
local air pollution control agency.”  EPA, INTERIM POLICY ON 
FEDERAL ENFORCEABILITY OF LIMITATIONS ON POTENTIAL TO 
EMIT 3-4 (1996), available at 
www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t5/memoranda/pte122.pdf.  Since then, 
EPA has not promulgated new definitions for PTE or “federally 
enforceable” under the PSD regulations.  Sylvanergy may argue 
that the definitions are therefore void. See, e.g., Alabama Power 
Co. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 450, 456 (D.C. Cir.1994) (stating that ”the 
effect of [a] vacatur of the regulation is to suspend the . . . 
compliance obligation pending further rulemaking by the agency).  
 
8. In addition, the NESHAPS regulations, unlike the PSD regulations, in-
clude a list of specific examples of “federally enforceable limitations” including 
limitations found in a Title V operating permit or in a state- or federally-
approved SIP.  40 C.F.R. § 63.2 (2015); see also 59 FR 12408-01 (Mar. 16, 1994) 
(adding this language to the regulations).  Notably, the examples do not include 
any local or state requirements as part of separate regulatory programs as the 
Forestdale site plan approval does here.  SOC and EPA can argue that if this 
arguably “broader” consideration of controls for PTE analysis under the 
NESHAPS provision does not include state and local controls, PTE under the 
PSD program certainly does not account for such controls or limitations. 
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Sylvanergy can also make a policy argument that the CAA is 
designed to allow state and local regulators to take the lead in 
meeting air pollution standards, and that—even if the 75-percent 
operational limitation as imposed by the site approval process is 
not part of New Union’s SIP—it should still be factored into the 
facility’s potential to emit.  SOC and EPA ultimately have the 
stronger argument that, even if the regulation is void, EPA’s 
interim policy remains in effect, and the limitations would still 
have to be enforceable by NUARB as the air pollution control 
agency to be factored into Sylvanergy’s PTE. 
VI. PSD REVIEW FOR GREENHOUSE GASES: IS A 
BIOMASS-FUELED FACILITY IS SUBJECT TO 
PSD REVIEW AS AN EMITTER OF GREENHOUSE 
GASES? 
As an initial matter, Sylvanergy maintains that its 
emissions of non-greenhouse gas emissions do not meet the 
thresholds to trigger PSD review.  See supra Part V.  Thus, the 
parties must address whether the facility, biomass or no biomass, 
is subject to PSD review for its potential to emit 350,000 tons per 
year of greenhouse gases in light of Utility Air Regulatory Group 
v. EPA (“UARG”), 134 S. Ct. 2427, 573 U.S. __, __ (2014).  The 
Supreme Court held in that case that sources not otherwise 
subject to PSD review cannot become subject to review “based 
solely on their emission of greenhouse gases.” Id. at 2443. The 
result of this holding was to partially vacate EPA’s 2010 GHG 
Tailoring Rule, in which the agency provided that PSD review 
would apply to new sources with the potential to emit at least 
100,000 tons per year CO2e and modified sources with net 
increased emissions of 75,000 tons per year CO2e.  See 75 Fed. 
Reg. 31514 (June 3, 2010).  Sylvanergy will cite to UARG for the 
proposition that its greenhouse gas emissions do not, in 
themselves, subject the facility to PSD review. 
EPA and SOC contend that the facility is an “anyway 
source”—that is, its emission of other regulated pollutants (i.e. 
carbon monoxide and potentially NOx, see supra Part V) trigger 
PSD review anyway.  The current regulations provide that 
anyway sources will be subject to PSD review for greenhouse gas 
emissions if emissions exceed 75,000 tons per year CO2e.  See 40 
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C.F.R. § 51.21(49)(iv)(a).  In UARG, the Supreme Court confirmed 
that this general approach, known as “Step 1” of EPA’s Tailoring 
Rule, was consistent with the CAA regulatory scheme.  See 134 S. 
Ct. at 2448-49.  However, the Court was concerned about the 
methodology that EPA used to arrive at 75,000 tons per year as a 
threshold level, and it compelled EPA to promulgate a new “de 
minimis” threshold level for triggering of PSD review.  Id. at 
2449.  The Court did not expressly void the 75,000-tpy threshold 
level, but implied that EPA should undergo a new rulemaking to 
arrive at a true de minimis level.  See id.  EPA has not yet 
published a proposed or final rule adjusting the threshold.  EPA 
has indicated that in the interim, it plans to continue applying 
the existing 75,000-tpy threshold to new anyway sources.9  EPA 
and SOC will argue that 75,000-tpy remains the appropriate 
threshold in light of existing regulations and because the Court 
did not expressly void Step 1 of the Tailoring Rule.  Sylvanergy 
will argue that it should not be required to undergo PSD review 
for greenhouse gases until EPA promulgates a new, appropriate 
de minimis threshold level. 
With regard to the facility’s unique characteristics as a 
biomass-fueled electricity plant, the parties will raise, as the EAB 
did, EPA’s 2011 “Deferral Rule” for biogenic sources.  This rule 
deferred application of PSD and Title V permitting requirements 
to CO2 emissions from biogenic stationary sources for three years 
in order to give the agency additional time to study the impacts of 
and develop an accounting framework for greenhouse gas 
emissions from these sources.  See Deferral for CO2 Emissions 
from Bioenergy and Other Biogenic Sources Under the Prevention 
of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V Programs, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 43,490 (July 20, 2011).  In the rule, EPA defined “biogenic 
CO2 emissions” as “emissions of CO2 from a stationary source 
directly resulting from the combustion or decomposition of 
biologically-based materials other than fossil fuels and mineral 
sources of carbon,” such as the “combustion of biological material, 
including all types of wood and wood waste, forest residue, and 
 
9. This approach has not been upheld by any court, but it is referenced in 
internal EPA memos.  See, e.g., JANET G. MCCABE, LETTER TO REGIONAL 
ADMINISTRATORS (July 24, 2014), available at 
http://www3.epa.gov/nsr/documents/20140724memo.pdf. 
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agricultural material.”  Deferral Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,493.  
EPA also noted that “at least some biomass feedstocks” used in 
energy production may have a “negligible impact on the net 
carbon cycle, or possibly even a positive net effect.”  76 Fed. Reg. 
at 43,499.  Policy goals to promote renewable energy development 
provided the foundation for this three year deferral: 
EPA recognizes that use of certain types of biomass can be part of 
the national strategy to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, [and] 
efforts are underway at the Federal, State and regional level to 
foster the expansion of renewable resources and promote 
bioenergy projects when they are a way to address climate 
change, increasing domestic alternative energy production, 
enhancing forest management and creating related employment 
opportunities. We believe part of fostering this development is to 
ensure that those feedstocks with negligible net atmospheric 
impact not be subject to unnecessary regulation. At the same 
time, it is important that EPA have time to conduct its detailed 
examination of the science and technical issues related to 
accounting for biogenic CO2 emissions and therefore have 
finalized this deferral. 
Id., 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,492.  However, the Deferral Rule, by its 
own terms, expired on July 21, 2014.  Id., 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,507.  
Additionally, in Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 
401 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the D.C. Circuit, in a split decision, vacated 
the Deferral Rule based on EPA’s failure to explain how the 
Clean Air Act provided it with authority to exempt biogenic 
carbon dioxide sources from the PSD permitting program and its 
improper use of the “one-step-at-a-time” doctrine of agency 
decisionmaking when it was unclear what would constitute 
ultimate, “full compliance” with the Act’s statutory mandates.10  
See id. at 410.  The court did not, however, hold that EPA could 
 
10. It is unclear whether the D.C. Circuit’s mandate in Center for Biological 
Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2013) was ever finalized, as the Court 
ruled in November 2013 that the appeal deadline would be extended until the 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in the UARG case.  In 2015, the court denied a 
petition for rehearing filed by the respondent-intervenors.  See Center for Biolog-
ical Diversity v. EPA, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12908 *1 (July 24, 2015).  This 
should not be of consequence due to the Deferral Rule’s expiration in 2014. 
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never create a future, permanent exemption for biogenic sources 
from the PSD and Title V permitting programs. 
Sylvanergy may try to argue that when it received its final 
permit from NUARB on June 12, 2014, the Deferral Rule was still 
in effect.  EPA and SOC will counter that the rule was voided by 
the D.C. Circuit’s holding in CBD v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 
2013).  Further, the EPA Administrator must enforce the 
regulations are they are currently in effect when she takes final 
action.  See General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 
540 (1990); Sierra Club v. EPA, 762 F.3d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 2014).  
In this case, the “final action” occurred when the Administrator 
placed her final stamp of approval on the permit pursuant to 40 
C.F.R. § 124.19(l)(2)(i), (3), after June 1, 2015.  Had the NUARB 
permit circumvented PSD review for greenhouse gases based on 
an exemption, Granger would have been obligated to remand the 
permit at that point as inconsistent with current federal law.  The 
EAB also presumed for the purposes of its holding on June 1, 
2015, that the Deferral Rule had expired by its own terms. 
Following the UARG decision and the expiration of the 
Deferral Rule, EPA’s plans for its future regulatory approach to 
greenhouse gas emissions from biogenic sources appear to be in 
flux.  In a letter sent to Regional Administrators in July 2014, 
Acting Assistant Administrator of the EPA Office of Air and 
Radiation, Janet McCabe, stated that the agency’s work on the 
biogenic CO2 assessment framework remains ongoing and 
recommended that the Regional Offices “consult with sources and 
permitting authorities on biomass related permitting questions as 
they arise.”  In November 2014, EPA issued a second draft of its 
technical report, the Framework for Assessing Biogenic CO2 
Emissions from Stationary Sources (2014).  Based on a previous 
peer review by EPA’s Science Advisory Board concluding that 
“[c]arbon neutrality cannot be assumed for all biomass energy,” 
and that the analysis depends greatly on the circumstances in 
which biomass is grown, harvested, and combusted, the report 
uses a lifecycle approach to look at biogenic carbon and carbon 
fluxes associated with these stages.  Id. at ii-iii, 48-49.  It does not 
draw conclusions regarding which types of biomass feedstocks 
result in fewer CO2 emissions, but rather sets forth factors that 
are to be considered when assessing these emissions and presents 
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an equation that could be used to calculate net atmospheric 
contributions of biogenic CO2 emissions.  See id. at 13.  As of 
December 2015, this accounting framework is not finalized and is 
still awaiting additional peer review comments of the Science 
Advisory Board. 
This issue lends itself to a number of policy arguments that 
each party can make. Sylvanergy will argue that requiring PSD 
review for its greenhouse gas emissions is duplicative and 
unnecessary given the unique posture of biogenic CO2 emissions.  
The record in this case does not include enough relevant data for 
the parties to assess biogenic CO2 emissions of the Forestdale 
biomass facility using the accounting framework described above.  
However, Sylvanergy may argue that the Framework is 
indicative of EPA’s intention to continue treating biomass plants 
differently from other stationary sources under the PSD program 
as sources that can play a role in reducing global greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Sylvanergy will also point to EPA’s 2011 Guidance for 
Determining Best Available Control Technology for Reducing 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Biogenic Production, which EPA 
indicated would serve as interim guidance until it completes its 
accounting framework process, described supra.  In these 
guidelines, EPA explained how biogenic CO2 emissions, which 
account for 97.9% of the global warming potential (GWP) of 
emissions from wood and wood residuals, are unique because 
these emissions participate directly in the global carbon cycle 
through photosynthesis, while plant material outside the 
boundaries of the facility also counteract CO2 emissions by 
sequestering carbon on a continuous basis.  See id. at 7-8. 
EPA and SOC will argue that without any other express 
exemption for biogenic emissions, the agency’s decision to conduct 
PSD review for those emissions does not rise to the level of 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).  EPA and 
SOC also have a persuasive argument that in the absence of 
scientific certainty on the greenhouse gas intensity of biogenic 
sources, the court should defer to the expertise of the agency in 
determining how to regulate greenhouse gases from biomass.  See 
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); 
Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2007).  EPA’s 2011 
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guidance document also recognized that not all biomass 
feedstocks result in zero net emissions, and indeed, the 
accounting framework indicates the agency’s intention to move 
away from a broad permitting exemption and toward a case-by-
case analysis of the carbon emissions lifecycle associated with 
each facility.  The D.C. Circuit in CBD v. EPA concluded that 
such analysis and determination of appropriate control 
technology is most appropriately left to the rigorous BACT 
analysis that takes place during PSD permitting.  722 F.3d at 
409, 411. 
 Sylvanergy may argue that (1) the biomass feedstock it 
had hoped to use (outside the context of the Sustainable Forest 
Plan) is often made up of decomposing forest waste, which would 
emit greenhouse gases either way; (2) when viewed over the long-
term, forest re-growth and re-absorption of CO2 makes up for 
emissions from operations; and/or (3) increased demand for 
biomass will actually lead to investments in forestry and 
incentivize forest growth.  SOC may counter that biomass 
emissions should be measured not from the lifecycle perspective, 
but on a timeframe closer to when the emissions arise from 
combustion.  This should also take into account indirect impacts 
of biomass plants, which may include deforestation due to 
increased demand for biomass feedstock and the use of whole 
trees rather than forest waste, which results in more greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
VII. BACT REQUIREMENTS FOR GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS 
New facilities subject to PSD review must achieve emissions 
limits that reflect the Best Available Control Technology, or 
BACT, for regulated pollutants emitted from their facilities at 
significant rates.  CAA § 165(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).  The 
Supreme Court held in UARG that EPA was within its authority 
to require BACT for “greenhouse gases emitted by sources 
otherwise subject to PSD review,” if the source emits more than a 
de minimis amount of greenhouse gases. 134 S. Ct. at 2448-49.  
BACT is defined as 
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an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of 
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this 
chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting 
facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts 
and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through 
application of production processes and available methods, 
systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or 
treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of 
each such pollutant. 
CAA §169, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3); see also 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(12) 
(2015).  In 1990, EPA published its “NSR Manual,” which 
explains how EPA and state agencies should determine BACT for 
a particular facility by a applying a top-down process, identifying 
all available control technologies for a given pollutant and 
ranking them in descending order of control effectiveness.  This 
process comprises five steps: 
1. Identify all potentially available control technology 
options; 
2. Eliminate “technically infeasible” control options; 
3. Rank the remaining technologies in terms of 
effectiveness, with the most effective technology 
ranked at the top; 
4. Confirm or reject the top-ranked technology taking 
into account energy, environmental, and economic 
impacts; and 
5. Select the most effective control technology not 
eliminated in step 4. 
See NSR Manual at B.5-9.  As the EAB has recognized, the NSR 
Manual, while not binding on the agency, offers the “careful and 
detailed analysis of BACT criteria required by the CAA and 
regulations” and “has guided states and federal permitting 
authorities on PSD requirements and policy for many years.”  In 
re. N. Mich. Univ. Ripley Heating Plant, 14 E.A.D. 283 (EAB 
2009) (quotation marks omitted).  A discussion of the two BACT-
related issues in the Problem follows. 
A. Did NUARB properly reject consideration of a wood 
gasification and partial carbon capture and storage plant 
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as BACT for the Sylvanergy facility? 
SOC contends that NUARB—and, by extension, EPA—
abused its discretion by rejecting wood gasification and partial 
carbon capture and storage as BACT for the Sylvanergy facility.  
NUARB rejected this option as an option that would 
impermissibly “redefine” the source.  See Problem at 7.  The EAB 
agreed, referring to EPA’s policy against considering facility 
alterations that change the fundamental nature of the source, 
and concluding that because Sylvanergy had proposed to generate 
electricity by burning wood, NUARB did not commit “clear error” 
when it opted not to require the facility to gasify wood and burn 
the gas in a combined cycle generation unit.  See Problem at 13-
14.  In In re Prairie State Generating Co., 13 E.A.D. 1, 23, 28 
(EAB 2006), the EAB held that this issue boils down to Step 1 of 
the BACT analysis and that EPA need not include in its Step 1 
list of available technologies those that redefine the fundamental 
purpose or the basic design of the proposed facility.  In an opinion 
upholding the Prairie State decision, the Seventh Circuit held 
that “[r]efining the statutory definition of ‘control technology’ . . . 
to exclude redesign is the kind of judgment by an administrative 
agency to which a reviewing court should defer.”  Sierra Club v. 
EPA, 499 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2007).  
SOC will first argue that requiring this technology would not 
redefine the source.  In Prairie State, the state agency did not 
consider low-sulfur coal from outside sources as BACT for a 
power plant because the plant was proposed to be built at the 
mouth of a mine so that it could use the mine’s 30-year supply of 
recoverable coal.  13 E.A.D. at 24, 28.  As the court in Sierra Club 
v. EPA pointed out, however, there is no bright line between 
“where control technology ends and a redesign of the proposed 
facility begins.”  499 F.3d 653, 655.  In order to guide which 
design aspects may be within the reach of BACT, the EAB has 
given central importance to “how the permit applicant defines the 
proposed facility’s purpose or basic design,” Prairie State, 13 
E.A.D. at 28, and the permit issuer should take a “hard look” at 
this definition.  Id. at 34-35; accord N. Michigan Univ. Ripley 
Heating Plant, 14 E.A.D. at 303 & n.28.  Those design elements 
that “may be changed to achieve pollutant emissions reductions 
without disrupting the applicant’s basic business purpose for the 
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proposed facility” may be appropriately considered under Step 1.  
Prairie State, 13 E.A.D. at 23. 
In In re Desert Rock Energy Co., 14 E.A.D. 484, 524-40 (EAB 
2009), the EAB held that the permitting agency failed to provide 
a sufficient explanation for why requiring the use of integrated 
combined gasification combined cycle (IGCC) technology for a coal 
power plant, which would otherwise use a typical pulverized coal 
process to burn coal and boil water to create steam, would 
redefine the source.  At the state level, the Supreme Court of 
Utah issued a similar ruling for a coal-fired power plant in 2009, 
concluding that: 
[T]he basic design of the Power Company’s proposed facility is an 
electric power generating plant fueled by coal. With this purpose, 
it is evident that the Power Company was not required to consid-
er wind generation for electric power as an alternative process. 
However, as in the Prairie State BACT analysis . . . the Power 
Company should have included IGCC in its BACT review. IGCC 
is a control technology that can reduce the emissions of several 
criteria pollutants.  The adoption of this standard would not re-
quire the Power Company to redefine the design of its proposed 
facility. The facility would still remain an electric power generat-
ing plant fueled by coal.  We note that the consideration of IGCC 
in the BACT review does not compel its adoption; instead, it only 
requires the Power Company to subject IGCC to the five-step top 
down analysis used to determine the best available technology. 
Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 226 P.3d 719, 
732-33 (Utah 2009).  Here, requiring Sylvanergy to install wood 
gasification and partial carbon capture as a control technology 
would not take away the facility’s identity as an electric power 
generating plant fueled by biomass.  SOC has a compelling 
argument under this line of cases that NUARB should have listed 
this technology under Step 1, which is intended to capture a 
broad array of potential options, and if not, should have provided 
a reasoned, detailed explanation for why it would redefine the 
source.  See N. Mich. Univ. Ripley Heating Plant, 14 E.A.D. at 
331 (remanding state PSD permit decision and requiring that any 
decision that a particular fuel choice would improperly redefine 
the source “must be thoroughly explained and supported with 
references to suitable legal authority”). 
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SOC will also argue that requiring partial carbon capture 
and storage fits well within the statutory framework.  According 
to the plain language of the statue, “control technologies” can 
include “fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel 
combustion techniques.” CAA §169, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).  The 
argument that partial carbon capture and storage fits within this 
definition is supported by EPA’s own interpretations.  In its 
Guidance for Determining Best Available Control Technology for 
Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Biogenic Production 
(2011), which is likely still in effect, see id. at 5, EPA states that it 
“classifies carbon capture and sequestration as an add-on 
pollution control technology that is ‘available’ for large CO2-
emitting facilities.” Id. at 13.  The EAB has held that “the 
question of availability for purposes of BACT is a practical, 
factual determination, using conventional notions of whether the 
technology can be put into use.”  In re Pennsauken, 2 E.A.D. 667 
(Adm’r 1988).  Technical feasibility is not considered at Step 1, 
and EPA stated in its guidelines that “even technologies that are 
in the initial stages of full development and deployment for an 
industry, such as CCS, can be considered ‘available’ as that term 
is used for the specific purposes of a BACT analysis under the 
PSD program.”  Guidance for Determining BACT at 14 n.27.  
Requiring this technology is consistent with the Clean Air Act’s 
“technology-forcing” regulatory regime, which courts have long 
recognized.  See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 365 
(D.C. Cir. 1981).  Sylvanergy and EPA may counter that EPA’s 
guidance indicates that such add-on pollution control is to be 
listed under Step 1 only for industrial facilities with high-purity 
CO2 streams, such as hydrogen production and ethanol 
production, see Guidance for Determining BACT at 13-14.  If SOC 
successfully argues the above points, it can stop there, as this is a 
sufficient basis to remand the permit.  SOC may also point to the 
details of the study it submitted on the record for the proposition 
that the proposed technology is technologically and economically 
feasible and preferable from an environmental standpoint. This 
analysis, however, goes to Step 4 of the BACT process, and would 
be for NUARB to consider on remand. 
Sylvanergy and EPA will likely aim to analogize 
Sylvanergy’s case with Prairie State, Ripley Heating Plant, and 
other similar cases and rely on the fact that the technology SOC 
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proposes would require Sylvanergy to make extensive technical 
modifications to its facility in a way that alters the proposed 
design, which turns on its wood-fired boiler.  Importantly, 
Sylvanergy and EPA can rely on the deferential standard of 
review that courts grant agencies dealing with close cases in 
areas requiring technical expertise.  See Baltimore Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. NRDC, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); Sierra Club v. EPA, 
499 F.3d 653, 656 (“We hesitate in a borderline case, such as this, 
to pronounce the EPA’s decision arbitrary, the applicable 
standard for judicial review of its granting the permit.”).  In the 
alternative, EPA and Sylvanergy may try to argue that any 
error in failing to consider this technology, or failing to explain its 
decision, was harmless error because the technology would prove 
to be technically infeasible (Step 2) or prohibitively expensive 
(Step 4), would not be selected as BACT, and thus, would have no 
bearing on the final agency action.  Cf. National Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 659-60 (2007) 
(recognizing the existence of harmless error rule in 
administrative law). 
B.  Is the Sustainable Forest Plan permissible as BACT for 
the Sylvanergy facility? 
Finally, Sylvanergy contends that EPA abused its discretion 
by allowing the Sustainable Forest Plan to be imposed in the PSD 
permit as BACT.  As it did before the EAB, Sylvanergy will make 
a two-pronged argument: (1) biomass fuel is in itself a form of 
BACT and should be the top-ranked option in Step 3, and (2) the 
Sustainable Forest Plan is a “beyond-the-fence” mitigation 
measure for greenhouse gas emissions, which does not fall within 
the plain meaning of “control technology” as defined by the Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 7479(3), and thus should have been rejected under 
Step 1.  SOC argues that the Sustainable Forest Plan should 
have been rejected under BACT step 4 as having unacceptable 
adverse environmental impacts.  The EAB, analyzing these 
arguments in turn, concluded that none of the issues raised by 
the parties rose to the level of “clear error” on the part of NUARB. 
Sylvanergy will argue, as an initial matter, that its proposal 
to use biomass fuel should have been considered as a form of 
BACT in itself.  It can point again to EPA’s Guidance for 
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Determining Best Available Control Technology for Reducing 
Carbon Monoxide Emissions from Biogenic Production (2011), in 
which EPA laid out an analysis that it “believes . . . will be 
sufficient in most cases to support the conclusion that utilization 
of biomass fuel alone is BACT for a bioenergy facility.”  Id. at 5.  
SOC and EPA can respond that although this may have been 
EPA’s position in 2011, the 2014 draft accounting framework 
indicates the agency’s growing recognition of the vast variability 
of carbon emissions from one biomass facility to another, 
depending on the source of biofuel, indirect impacts, and 
associated lifecycle emissions.  The newest draft framework for 
analyzing these emissions is in part in response to the Science 
Advisory Board’s conclusion that “[t]here is considerable 
heterogeneity in feedstock types, sources and production methods 
and thus net biogenic carbon emissions will vary considerably.”  
Framework for Assessing Biogenic CO2 Emissions at ii-iii; see also 
Guidance for Determining BACT at 21-22.  In addition, EPA has 
recognized that individual cases may warrant certain issues 
being addressed through the BACT process, and that the 
permitting authority has discretion to make decisions based on 
the facts before it.  Here, as the EAB recognized in the decision 
below, Sylvanergy is not only using fossil fuels to run its startup 
burners; it has also made no commitment that its fuel sources 
would be sustainability harvested or that it would otherwise 
control its estimated 350,000 tons per year of greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Sylvanergy will next argue that, even if use of biofuel is not 
in itself a form of BACT, the Sustainable Forest Plan cannot 
constitute BACT, which is defined as “an emissions limitation . . . 
which the Administrator, on a case-by-case basis taking into 
account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other 
costs, determines is achievable . . . through application of 
production processes or available methods, systems, and 
techniques, including fuel cleaning or treatment or innovative 
fuel combustion techniques for control of such pollutant.”  CAA 
§ 169, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).  A dedicated reforestation area does 
not “control” the emissions coming out of Sylvanergy’s stacks, it 
will argue, but rather offsets them through long-term 
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sequestration processes, which are outside of Sylvanergy’s 
control.11  EPA may respond by pointing to the fact that 
Sylvanergy’s initial argument—that use of biofuels is BACT in 
itself—relies on the idea that sequestration occurs over time.  
This occurs offsite and over long timeframes and is equally 
outside of the company’s control. 
EPA will argue that the Sustainable Forest Plan is a 
permissible form of control technology given the unique 
characteristics of greenhouse gas emissions and that the Plan 
was the only control option presented that was “potentially 
available” within the meaning of the statute.  EPA can argue that 
the statutory language does not require any particular type of 
control technology, but rather focuses on finding “an emission 
limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction” unique to 
the specific characteristics and needs of the facility.  Because 
greenhouse gases are a global pollutant for which local 
environmental and health impacts are difficult to identify and 
quantify, the agency is branching out from traditional “end-of-
stack” environmental controls in favor of methods that allow for 
meaningful reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. This includes 
the consideration of energy efficiency measures as BACT.  See 
Guidance for Determining BACT at 14.  In the seminal case 
Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984), the Supreme Court 
held that EPA’s “bubble concept” for treating industrial grouping 
together for the purposes of PSD permitting was a reasonable 
policy choice for the agency to make.  Similarly, here, where there 
is no regulatory language excluding offsite control measures, EPA 
will argue it has discretion to apply them.  EPA also has a 
persuasive argument that Chevron “Step 2” deference should 
apply to its interpretation of law.  Because the statutory language 
 
11. Sylvanergy can also make a “redefining the source” argument parallel 
to the one it makes regarding partial carbon capture and sequestration, see su-
pra Part VII(A).  By requiring it to purchase a specific plot of land and manage a 
forest to produce its own biofuel, NUARB has impermissibly changed the source 
from what Sylvanergy proposed, which was to purchase feedstock from offsite 
and process it onsite.  See In re Prairie State Generating Co., 13 E.A.D. 1, 23, 28 
(EAB 2006); Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2007).  The 
strength of this argument is undermined, however, by the fact that Sylvanergy 
did not identify a specific feedstock or source from where it planned to obtain 
feedstock.  Thus the source of biomass feedstock was arguably not part of the 
facility’s basic purpose or design. 
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neither expressly includes nor excludes offsite control measures, 
the statute may be considered ambiguous with regard to this 
issue, at which point the Court should defer to the agency and 
uphold its position if it is “based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.”  Id. at 843.  Given the technical and scientifically 
complex nature of the BACT process for greenhouse gases, the 
Court should be “at its most deferential.”  Baltimore Gas & Elec. 
Co., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
EPA may or may not choose to point to its recent rules issued 
under section 111(d) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d), also known 
as its Clean Power Plan for existing power plants.  EPA 
considered certain beyond-the-fence measures during the 
rulemaking process, see 79 Fed. Reg. 34,829, 34,888-89 (June 18, 
2014), and, not only specific technologies, but “the full range of 
operational practices, limitations, constraints and opportunities 
that bear upon EGUs’ emission performance.” Carbon Pollution 
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units (Unofficial Version) at 27 (August 3, 
2015).12  Sylvanergy may counter that, unlike BACT, the section 
111 technology requirement for the Best System of Emissions 
Reduction (BSER) is broader and not defined in the statute, thus 
making it more appropriate for application of beyond-the-fence 
measures. 
SOC’s strongest argument is that the permit should be 
remanded for NUARB’s failure to consider its comments and 
explain its reasoning in the permit decision.  See Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43-44 
(1983) (holding that an agency action is arbitrary and capricious 
if it “entirely fail[s] to consider an important aspect of the 
problem” or if it fails to articulate a “rational connection between 
the facts found and the choice made”).  Here, SOC has developed 
a record to support its proposition by submitting extensive 
comments and studies regarding the negative impacts of 
monoculture coppice plantings, and NUARB provided no response 
 
12. Note that competitors are not permitted to cite to the final ver-
sion of the Clean Power Plan, which was published in the Federal Register 
in October 2015, after the September 1 cutoff date for the Problem, and goes into 
effect on December 22, 2015, See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Ex-
isting Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 FR 64,662-01, 
64,667 (October 23, 2015). 
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at all.  Related to this point, SOC can argue that NUARB’s top-
down BACT analysis was insufficient because Step 4 requires the 
agency to take into account energy, environmental, and economic 
impacts.  Referred to by EPA as “collateral impacts analysis,” see 
Guidance for Determining BACT at 17, Step 4 requires the 
agency to consider a wide range of environmental impacts, both 
direct and indirect.  See NSR Manual at B.46.  The consideration 
of collateral environmental impacts may require rejection of a 
less stringent control option in favor of a more stringent option, 
such as partial carbon capture and storage. See In re N. Cty. Res. 
Recovery Assocs., 2 E.A.D. 229, 230-31 (Adm’r 1986).  EPA may 
counter that it did consider these environmental impacts, but 
that they were outweighed by the environmental benefits of the 
creation of renewable energy facility and the fact that the 
Sustainable Forest Plan was economically feasible for 
Sylvanergy, also important considerations in the Step 4 process of 
selecting the top-ranked control option.  See Problem at 12. 
VIII. SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR JUDGES 
These questions are suggested as a starting point.  Please 
feel free to develop your own. 
Issue 1: Jurisdiction to Review Denial of NAD Request 
 Sylvanergy 
o Does the First Circuit’s holding in Puerto Rican 
Cement lend support to or undermine your 
argument? 
o If you are arguing that the NAD decision is a 
reviewable final agency action, wouldn’t you 
have had to seek review within the 60-day 
statute of limitations pursuant to section 
307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act? 
o If you had sought judicial review directly 
following NUARB’s denial of your NAD 
request, could we have reviewed that as a 
“final action of the Administrator” of EPA? 
 SOC and Granger/EPA 
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o How do you respond to the holding of the First 
Circuit in Puerto Rican Cement, which held 
that a NAD is separately reviewable as a “final 
action of the Administrator?” 
o How does our jurisdiction differ from that of 
Environmental Appeal Board’s?  That is, if the 
EAB could not review the NAD decision, why 
would it be the case that this Court may review 
it? 
o Isn’t the NAD request and denial just an 
interim step in the PSD process? 
o Wouldn’t this issue have been an interlocutory 
appeal if Sylvanergy sought review of it prior 
to the final PSD permit determination? If so, 
how could the company ever seek review of 
that decision if not as part of this appeal? 
o Would the federal courts even have jurisdiction 
to consider a NAD determination by a state 
agency that has not been adopted by EPA? 
Issue 2(a): Applicability Determination - Fossil-Fuel Fired 
Steam Electric Plant 
 Sylvanergy and Granger/EPA 
o If Sylvanergy proposes to use diesel fuel to fire 
its startup burners, how is the boiler and 
associated technology not “fossil-fuel fired?” 
o Is the term “fossil-fuel fired steam electric 
plant” defined in the PSD regulations? 
o What do you regard as the appropriate 
standard for our review of this determination 
by NUARB?  Should it be different given that 
EPA is arguing a position different from 
NUARB’s? 
 SOC 
o What regulatory definitions are you using to 
conclude that the Sylvanergy facility is a fossil-
fuel fired steam electric plant? 
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o The record states that the ultra-low sulfur 
diesel start-up burners each have a heat input 
capacity of 60 MMBtu.  Because these added 
together amount to less than the 250 MMBtu 
required to make a fossil-fuel fired source a 
major emitting facility, how can we conclude 
that the facility meets the section 169(1) 
definition? 
Issue 2(b): Applicability Determination – Potential to Emit 
 Sylvanergy 
o How do you respond to the regulatory 
definitions and cases of the Environmental 
Appeals Board confirming that operational 
limitations must be federally enforceable in 
order to be factored into your potential to emit 
(PTE)? 
o Why should EPA essentially take you at your 
word that the facility will abide by this 
operational limitation and not emit above the 
threshold amounts of carbon monoxide?  Could 
you not have asked to include them in the final 
PSD permit? 
o Is the holding of National Mining Association 
v. EPA applicable to this case given that 
NESHAPS is a different provision of the Act? 
Importantly, the triggering provisions for 
NESHAPS ask the agency to “consider 
controls” as part of the potential to emit, see 
CAA § 112(a)(1). 
 SOC and Granger/EPA 
o Why should we not follow the D.C. Circuit’s 
holding in National Mining Association v. EPA, 
which was that “demonstrably effective” state 
and local controls should not be disregarded in 
the PTE calculation just because the 
NESHAPS regulations required controls to be 
federally enforceable? 
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o Are the PTE definitions voided by the D.C. 
Circuit’s holding in the unpublished Chemical 
Manufacturers Association case, which vacated 
the federal enforceability requirement right 
after the National Mining holding? 
o What if the village site plan approval process 
was incorporated into New Union’s State 
Implementation Plan?  Would your answer be 
different? 
Issue 3: Applicability of PSD review to biogenic GHG 
emissions 
 Sylvanergy 
o Do you concede that you are an “anyway” 
source under the Supreme Court’s UARG 
holding because of your emissions of other non-
greenhouse gas pollutants? 
o If the Deferral Rule expired by its own terms 
on July 21, 2014, and was vacated by the D.C. 
Circuit, how is there any argument that 
greenhouse gas emissions from biomass 
sources are somehow exempt from the PSD 
program? 
o Why would this Court not follow the legislative 
purpose behind the PSD program, which is to 
protect public health and welfare from any 
adverse effects from air pollution and to 
prevent new non-attainment areas from 
arising? 
o Would you say the statute is ambiguous with 
regard to whether EPA should regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions from biogenic 
sources? If so, isn’t this a situation where we 
apply Chevron deference to the agency’s 
interpretation of law? 
 SOC and Granger/EPA 
o How do you address the Supreme Court’s 
holding in the UARG case? Didn’t it vacate the 
43
   
60 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 7 
 
Tailoring Rule and leave EPA without 
authority to regulate greenhouse gases under 
the PSD program? 
o Whose decision are we reviewing here? That of 
NUARB, or the Environmental Appeals Board? 
o Hasn’t EPA itself recognized in previous 
guidance documents that biomass fuel sources 
often result in net-zero carbon emissions? Isn’t 
PSD review unnecessary? 
o Would you say that we are in the realm of 
Chevron Step 1 or Step 2?  Is the statute 
ambiguous with regard to EPA’s authority to 
regulate biogenic greenhouse gas emissions? 
Issue 4: Wood Gasification and Partial CCS as BACT 
 SOC 
o Doesn’t the Prairie State case and the 7th 
Circuit decision upholding the EAB’s decision 
tell us that if a control technology requires 
major design modifications to the facility, it 
must be rejected under Step 1 of BACT? 
o Because there is no bright line rule with regard 
to when a control technology crosses over and 
starts to “redefine the source,” shouldn’t this 
Court defer to the agency’s technical 
determination given its expertise? 
o Is this wood gasification and partial carbon 
capture technologically feasible? Is one study 
based on a hypothetical plant really enough to 
tell us that it will work on the ground? 
 [Note: The strongest response here is 
that the Court need not reach that issue 
to remand the permit under Step 1 of 
BACT analysis.] 
 Sylvanergy and Granger/EPA 
o Even if the agency had no intentions of 
selecting this technology as BACT, don’t the 
holdings of the Environmental Appeals Board 
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tell us that NUARB should nonetheless have 
considered it under Step 1, which is intended 
to capture a wide array of possible 
technologies, even if they are in their initial 
stages of development? 
o What did Sylvanergy propose as the facility’s 
“basic purpose or design?” Would the use of 
this control technology really change the 
facility’s fundamental identity as a biomass-
fired electricity plant? 
o If nothing else, shouldn’t NUARB have 
provided a more detailed explanation for why 
this technology would redefine the source? 
Don’t we have a basis to remand the final 
permit on this procedural basis alone? 
Issue 5: Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT 
 Sylvanergy 
o Are you arguing that the use of biomass fuels 
is, standing alone, BACT for your facility?  
Doesn’t EPA’s draft accounting framework for 
biogenic carbon emissions indicate that there is 
too much variability for a blanket statement 
like this to be appropriate? 
o Doesn’t the regulatory definition of BACT 
allow NUARB to consider a wide array of 
“production processes” and “systems” and 
“techniques?” 
o Aren’t greenhouse gases and the way that they 
cycle through the earth’s atmosphere unique in 
a way that warrants innovative forms of 
BACT? 
o If the law neither expressly allows nor 
disallows offsite mitigation, shouldn’t we defer 
to the interpretation of the agency in this 
scientifically complex area, where each BACT 
decision is made on a detailed case-by-case 
basis? 
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 EPA 
o How is a broad, all-encompassing “Plan” that 
requires Sylvanergy to purchase land and use 
it as dedicated fuel a form of “control 
technology”? Even if it is, does carbon 
sequestration in the reforestation area 
“control” the emissions coming out of 
Sylvanergy’s stacks? 
o Under State Farm and other cases, wasn’t it 
arbitrary and capricious for the agency to not 
consider the comments submitted by SOC 
regarding the environmental impacts of the 
Plan and explain on the record why they did 
not affect the final decision? 
 SOC 
o At what step of the BACT process would you 
expect the agency to take these environmental 
concerns into consideration? 
o What result would you hope for on remand? If 
EPA considers your proposed technology 
alternative as impermissibly redefining the 
source, what other result could there be? 
o Isn’t any error on the part of the agency in 
failing to consider your comments harmless, 
given the great environmental benefits of 
creating a renewable biomass energy facility 
and the greater economic costs of your 
proposed partial CCS alterative? 
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